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Forex interventions: the Czech experience 
Tomáš Holub 
Introduction 
This note discusses the role of foreign exchange interventions in the Czech inflation targeting regime 
since 1998. It does not aim to provide an exhaustive analysis using econometric techniques, but rather 
to summarise the major stylised facts and policy considerations. This may be useful on several 
grounds. First, the Czech National Bank’s (CNB’s) approach to managing the exchange rate float has 
gone through a process of evolution. It is thus important to ask where it stands at present, and what 
the policy recommendations should be if the CNB were to face another period of exchange rate 
turbulence in the future. Second, the Czech experience may contribute as an interesting case study to 
the growing international literature on managed floating. The operational issues of the foreign 
exchange interventions are an important aspect of this debate. Finally, there may also be lessons for 
future ERM II membership, in which foreign exchange interventions may gain in importance.   
I will discuss the direct interventions only. It must be noted that verbal interventions are also used 
frequently by many central banks, including the CNB, to influence exchange rates. These verbal 
interventions may be no less important than the direct ones. They are not dealt with here, however, as 
they do not pose such big challenges, for example, in terms of sterilisation costs or communication 
openness, which this note discusses.    
The note is organised as follows. Section I describes exchange rate developments in the Czech 
Republic. Section II presents major policy steps in exchange rate management. Section  III 
summarises some stylised facts on the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions. Section IV 
analyses the sterilisation costs. Section V is devoted to the public communication of foreign exchange 
interventions. Section VI summarises and concludes. 
1.  Exchange rate developments  
From the beginning of its economic transition the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia until the end of 
1992) used a fixed exchange rate regime with a narrow band towards a basket of foreign currencies. 
The band was widened to ±7.5% in February 1996 and abandoned in May 1997, after a bout of 
currency turmoil that forced the CNB to introduce a managed floating system. In late 1997 the CNB 
announced that it would use the inflation targeting regime as a new nominal anchor for the economy, 
starting from January 1998. This regime has been in place since then, even though it has gone 
through an evolutionary process as far as its particular details are concerned (including exchange rate 
management issues - see below).    
In this section, I briefly describe the exchange rate developments of the Czech koruna. Figure 1 shows 
the koruna’s monthly nominal and real effective exchange rate, based both on CPI and PPI, since 
1993. 
As one can see, the real effective exchange rate has exhibited an appreciating trend over the whole 
period since 1993 (both in CPI and PPI terms), regardless of exchange rate regime changes. Before 
2001, real appreciation was mainly driven by an inflation differential, since then it has been through a 
strengthening of the nominal exchange rate. The appreciating trend might be explained by a 
combination of several factors, including the Balassa-Samuelson effect, terms-of-trade gains, 
deregulation of administered prices, etc. It can thus be considered an equilibrium phenomenon unless 
it exceeds some reasonable speed. This speed is, however, difficult to determine precisely, as only 
some of its factors can be quantified relatively easily (most analyses focus on the Balassa-Samuelson BIS Papers No 24  151
 
effect only). A challenge potentially stemming from this real trend is that it may coordinate exchange 
rate expectations in one direction, ie towards appreciation.
1 The price convergence process may also 
contribute to volatility of the exchange rate if market expectations concerning the long-run trend 
change substantially over time. It is moreover difficult to find an appropriate monetary policy response 
to such developments if the central bank is itself fairly uncertain on what the equilibrium real exchange 
rate might be. 
Figure 1 















Source: Czech National Bank. 
Figure 1 also shows that the medium-term volatility (ie fluctuations around the long-run trend) of both 
the nominal and real exchange rate has increased substantially since the exchange rate’s fluctuation 
band was widened in February 1996, and abolished in May 1997. The koruna has experienced two 
waves of rather sharp appreciation in recent years, which were only followed by depreciations to (or 
below) the trend level with some time lag. The first wave took place in 1998, when the koruna 
appreciated above its pre-floating level, in spite of the crises in Russia and Latin America. The second, 
and more pronounced, wave started in 2001 and lasted till late 2002. Although these two periods were 
both affected by other strong external influences and price shocks, it is probably more than a 
coincidence that both these cases were marked by sub-trend economic growth and undershooting of 
the CNB’s inflation targets. 
The short-term volatility is summarised in Figure 2 by a moving 60-day standard deviation of the 
koruna/euro exchange rate in terms of both absolute level and daily percentage changes. From this 
figure, one can see that the short-run volatility of the exchange rate was, as expected, greatest in the 
turbulent year 1997, but was also fairly high throughout 1998 and early 1999. After stabilising at quite 
modest levels since mid-1999, another increase in the exchange rate’s short-term volatility was 
                                                       
1   It might thus be one alternative explanation why interventions have been biased towards purchases of foreign exchange in 
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observed during the appreciation episode of 2002, even though its magnitude remained - perhaps a 
bit surprisingly - well below the previous peaks.
2 
Figure 2 
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2.  Management of the exchange rate 
When the floating exchange rate was introduced in May 1997, it was announced that the exchange 
rate regime would be a managed float, the Deutsche mark (euro at present) serving as a reference 
currency. The CNB thus retained the possibility to intervene in the foreign exchange market “in the 
event of excessive volatility or unjustified exchange rate trends”. This section summarises the CNB’s 
policy measures responding to the exchange rate developments.  
In line with the announced managed floating policy, the CNB intervened occasionally in the foreign 
exchange market. With the exception of the turbulent year 1997 (which does not belong to the period 
of inflation targeting) the interventions de facto always concerned purchases of foreign exchange to 
slow down exchange rate appreciation (see Figure 3).
3 
The periods of high intervention activity were typically followed by quite long periods of no 
interventions. The most active periods were (i) February-July 1998; (ii) October 1999-March 2000; and 
(iii) October 2001-September 2002. In the first and third cases, this coincided with the periods of fast 
nominal effective exchange rate appreciation (Figure 1), which peaked above 15% year-on-year. In 
the second case, the koruna appreciated against the euro, but it depreciated quite strongly against the 
US dollar at the same time, due to the euro/US dollar exchange rate developments. As a result, there 
                                                       
2   The short-term volatility of the koruna’s exchange rate is analysed econometrically in Bulíř (2003).  
3   In 2004 the CNB started selling earnings on its foreign exchange reserves to prevent them from growing further (see the 
end of data sample in Figure 3). This step, however, was not intended as a monetary policy measure, but as a balance-
sheet adjustment step.    BIS Papers No 24  153
 
was no strong nominal effective exchange rate appreciation (Figure 1). This might be interpreted as an 
indirect ‘confirmation’ of the euro’s reference-currency role in the Czech managed floating. 
There are two interesting questions concerning the use of interventions. First, what was the main 
trigger for interventions, and second, why they were so skewed towards interventions against 
appreciation? Concerning the first question, one can point to medium-term exchange rate volatility and 
its impact on macroeconomic developments as the primary trigger of interventions. By this I mean that 
the CNB usually responded to fast exchange rate movements that exceeded any reasonable 
equilibrium trend and extended beyond the normal high-frequency volatility of the exchange rate. Such 
exchange rate developments have a potential to influence the inflation rate and economic activity, both 
through the direct exchange rate channel and most likely also by bringing the exchange rate out off 
line with the fundamental value (no matter how difficult it is to determine this precisely). This being 
said, the first and third intervention episodes also coincided with periods of relatively high short-term 
exchange rate volatility (Figure 2), which may serve as an additional explanation for the use of 
interventions. 
Figure 3 
















































































































































Source: Czech National Bank. 
The second question, concerning the interventions’ asymmetry, can be rephrased to query why the 
CNB did not react to the depreciations of the currency in the same way it did to fast appreciations. An 
easy answer could be that the central bank was trying to influence the long-run exchange rate trend or 
targeting a particular level of the exchange rate. Nevertheless, I do not subscribe to this point of view. 
The long-run appreciating trend has openly been acknowledged in the CNB’s strategic documents, 
and no specific exchange rate targets exist at the CNB, even internally. The asymmetry may thus 
rather be related to the coordination effect on market expectations of the real appreciation trend (see 
above) and/or to the inflation target undershooting and an output gap negative since 1997, and which 
required a relaxation of monetary conditions under the inflation targeting regime (see Holub (2004)). 
Besides direct interventions in the foreign exchange market, the CNB has also adopted other 
measures in response to exchange rate developments. A special account for the government’s foreign 
exchange privatisation revenues was established at the CNB in early 2000, with the aim of reducing 
the exchange rate impact of large privatisation sales. This step was explained by the fact that massive 154  BIS Papers No 24
 
privatisations represented a one-off influence on the exchange rate driven by the government’s 
actions, entailing a possible distorsion of the market equilibrium. From this point of view, it was 
regarded by the CNB as justifiable to offset this influence with a coordinated, non-standard action by 
the authorities. Moreover, it was also believed that the special account would have a stronger 
signalling effect on the market than its potential alternative, ie direct interventions by the CNB in the 
market.  
An important aspect of this privatisation account has been facilitated communication between the CNB 
and government on exchange rate issues. Apart from this positive role, however, the effectiveness of 
the account was limited till 2001 by the fact that the government never kept its privatisation revenues 
on the account for long, as it needed the money to improve the weak fiscal situation. With the largest 
privatisation sales still to come (electricity, gas, telecommunications, etc), which were cited by market 
participants as the main reason for the exchange rate appreciation in late 2001, the CNB and the 
government reached an agreement in January 2002. This agreement has kept all of the government’s 
foreign exchange revenues out of the market and at the same time allowed fiscal needs to be financed 
from privatisation revenues. Direct purchases of the government’s foreign exchange revenues by the 
CNB have been the most important element of the agreement. So far, the CNB has purchased over 
euro 4.2 billion from the state. Besides being a decision taken to postpone issues of the government’s 
eurobonds, the aim of matching public foreign exchange revenues and outlays (and matching foreign 
exchange assets with liabilities), etc became more important. 
It is also important to keep in mind that the interventions can not be assessed in isolation from 
changes in the main monetary policy instrument, ie short-term interest rates. The interest rate changes 
may support the effectiveness of interventions, both via the traditional arbitrage conditions and through 
the credibility channel. I argued in Holub (2004) that the interest rate changes and interventions should 
be viewed as reinforcing tools rather than as substitutes. In other words, in order to avoid a loss of 
monetary policy credibility, the interventions should not go in the opposite direction to the interest rate 
moves. Moreover, the policy framework should acknowledge that interest rates and interventions are 
not two independent instruments that would allow the authorities to achieve their price stability 
objective with their preferred configuration of interest rates and the exchange rate. In the Czech case, 
nominal interest rates were on a declining trend from the introduction of inflation targeting, with an 
exception of four minor interest rate hikes so far (by 0.25% in March 1998, July 2001, June 2004 and 
August 2004). The first period of interest rate cuts started in July 1998 and lasted till late 1999. It thus 
de facto followed the first wave of foreign exchange interventions (coinciding with it in July 1998 only), 
and its last stage coincided with the beginning of the second intervention wave. Another period of 
interest rate cuts started in November 2001 and went on till mid-2003, thus coinciding with (and 
extending beyond) the last episode of intervention activity. 
3.  Some stylised facts on the effectiveness of exchange rate management 
It would require a detailed econometric analysis to judge whether and to what extent the foreign 
exchange interventions and other policy measures were effective in influencing exchange rate 
developments. Moreover, one would need to analyse not only what actually happened after the 
interventions, but also compare this to what would have happened without them (ie to know the 
counterfactual). This is however extremely difficult to do, not least because we lack a reliable model 
describing the short-run dynamics of exchange rates. It would also be necessary to study in detail the 
microstructure of the koruna’s market (see Derviz (2003) for such an analysis), which goes beyond the 
scope of this note. I thus limit myself to a discussion of some stylised facts. These are summarised in 
Table 1.    
In some cases, the interventions seem to have had a visible, immediate impact on the exchange rate. 
A typical example is March 2000, when interventions of slightly less than euro 400 million took place. 
The exchange rate depreciated almost by 2% and remained at a weaker level till mid-2000. Another 
similar case is February-April 1998, even though this time the weakening of the koruna was more 
short-lived (till the beginning of May 1998) in spite of a relatively high volume of interventions. In 
October 1999, the interventions reached almost euro 1 billion, and the exchange rate depreciated by 
more than 3%, and remained weaker till mid-December 1999. In some other situations, though, the 
impact was much less clear. For example in June-July 1998, the CNB bought about euro 500 million, 
but the koruna depreciated only with some lag, which coincided with the out-break of the Russian BIS Papers No 24  155
 
crisis. There were even cases in which the short-term impact of interventions was quite weak and 
non-lasting, such as in December 1999 or in late2001 (even though it may be true that without these 
interventions the exchange rate might have gone on appreciating further). 
The immediate impact of the interventions thus looks quite uncertain, but the impact occasionally 
might last up to two or three months according to the Czech experience. No particular, ideal 
intervention strategy (eg open vs undisclosed; large vs smaller; etc) can be identified at first sight, 
though. Something that did work in one situation may have had little effect in another one. Moreover, 
even many of the “successful” interventions were not able to prevent relatively prolonged periods of 
exchange rate overvaluation in 1998 or in 2002. A key issue for the effectiveness seems to be how the 
interventions interact with market expectations, which may be very different in different periods. This 
is, unfortunately, quite hard to tell before an intervention is actually carried out. 
 
Table 1 
Effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions 
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02/1998 04/1998  1285  37,87  38,50 38,37 36,30 36,46 36,11 35,11 
06/1998 07/1998  508  36,95  36,11  36,49 34,35 34,35 35,47 35,17 
10/1999 10/1999  966  36,52  36,36  35,72 35,68 36,62 36,40 36,03 
12/1999 12/1999  229  36,36  36,40  36,08 35,83 36,13 36,03 35,60 
03/2000 03/2000  394  36,05  35,71  35,65 35,53 35,63 36,31 36,02 
10/2001 01/2002  643  33,86  34,19  33,91 31,46 31,92 31,79 30,36 
04/2002 04/2002  1  009  32,08  31,39 30,62 30,06 30,63 30,56 29,75 
07/2002 09/2002  954  30,36  30,30  29,25 28,97 30,30 30,65 31,19 
Source: Czech National Bank. 
 
The most recent experience, in late 2001 and during 2002, fits rather well into this picture. When the 
exchange rate started to appreciate abruptly in the second half of 2001, it was usually attributed by 
analysts and market participants to expectations of future foreign exchange privatisation revenues. 
The CNB tried to resist this tendency with foreign exchange interventions in October 2001 (euro 240 
million) and December 2001 (euro 100 million). At the same time, from October 2001 the CNB 
signalled to the market its intention to reach an agreement with the government on the privatisation 
revenues. Nevertheless, the market seemed to be discounting this information heavily, and the 
expectations remained biased towards appreciation. When the agreement was approved on 
16 January 2002, it had surprisingly little effect on the market, even though its mechanisms were quite 
strong (unprecedentedly) and removed the major alleged source of appreciation.
5 The major 
                                                       
4   To get a feeling of the relative scope of the CNB’s interventions, note that the average daily turnover in the koruna foreign 
exchange market was about US dollar 700-800 million (euro 800-820 million) in 2002. The Czech yearly GDP is roughly 
equivalent to euro 75 billion. 
5   The minutes of the 21 January extraordinary Board meeting state: “The rapid strengthening of the koruna observed at the 
end of 2001 was primarily linked to the anticipation of converting a significant part of the state’s foreign exchange incomes 
into Czech koruna. It was stated that considering the extent of the approved measures (ie the agreement with the 
government), the exchange rate was likely to shift back to a level corresponding to the economic fundamentals. However, 
the exchange rate did not react in this way, and as a result, monetary conditions were disproportionately tightened.” (see 
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explanation for the continued strengthening shifted from the privatisation revenues to the long-run, real 
appreciation trend of the Czech koruna.  
Therefore, the CNB Board held an extraordinary meeting on 21 January 2002, at which it decided to 
carry out open foreign exchange interventions (altogether euro 305 million in January 2002) and an 
interest rate cut of 0.25% points. The koruna weakened by slightly less than 1.5% on that day, but was 
back at its pre-intervention level in four days and continued strengthening at a pace that even 
accelerated till the beginning of April 2002. On 4 April, the CNB thus started to openly intervene again. 
Overall, the volume of interventions reached euro 1 billion during April 2002. The exchange rate ended 
the month where it had been at its beginning (see Table 1), which was perhaps a rather disappointing 
result, given the high intervention volume, although the appreciation tendency was at least halted till 
late June 2002. This experience suggests that even relatively large interventions may have a modest 
effect at best when market expectations are set in one direction and the central bank tries to “lean 
against the wind”. 
Nevertheless, the “undisclosed” interventions that the CNB made in July-September 2002 (together 
roughly euro 1 billion) seem to have had an important effect. The koruna/euro exchange rate ended 
the year 9% weaker compared to its all-time high of 10 July 2002, and remained relatively weak in 
2003 as well. The apparent effectiveness of these interventions can be explained by a combination of 
several factors. These included: (i) a change in market expectations, supported by some adverse 
macroeconomic news; (ii) a negative interest rate differential, making the koruna less attractive for 
investors; (iii) a change in the market’s perception of the sterilisation costs after the interest rate 
differential became negative; (iv) implementation of the agreement with the government in practice, 
combined with delays in further privatisation.  
Changed market expectations were probably the most important factor. Once market expectations 
ceased to be skewed towards appreciation, and the one-sided bets became less interesting due to a 
combination of a zero interest rate differential with more exchange rate uncertainty, it was perhaps a 
matter of time only until some negative fundamental news initiated a correction. And to the extent that 
the policy measures (interest rate cuts, interventions and the agreement) contributed to this change, 
we can say that they might have had a medium-term impact on the exchange rate. This medium-term 
effect was - perhaps surprisingly - stronger than the immediate impact. This highlights the signalling 
role of foreign exchange interventions as opposed to their “market-equilibrating” effect. At the same 
time, it is very difficult to assess the contribution of interventions in isolation from other factors and 
policy steps (such as interest rate changes), and it is therefore not possible to arrive at a clearly 
positive judgement on their role in the Czech inflation targeting framework.  
On balance, the Czech experience does not shed too much light on the inconclusive debate on the 
effectiveness of interventions, and both critics and supporters of interventions can find their favourite 
bits in the overall evidence. Nonetheless, it is fair to note that the apparent instability of transmission 
between the interventions and their outcomes casts a serious doubt on the possibility of using them 
more systematically as a policy instrument under the inflation targeting regime. 
4. Sterilisation  costs 
It is widely accepted that monetary policy goals must not be subordinated to profit considerations. 
Nonetheless, when considering the use of foreign exchange interventions, which are supposed to be a 
complementary policy instrument at best, and are not crucial for achieving the main goal of long-run 
price stability, the sterilisation costs should be taken into account. This section presents a simple 
estimate of these costs for the Czech Republic.   
The foreign exchange interventions and purchases from the government within the special agreement 
have resulted in a growth of the CNB’s foreign exchange reserves. The volume of foreign exchange 
reserves was growing rapidly during the period of fixed exchange rate and fast capital inflows till 1996. 
After declining during 1997, they started to grow gradually again due to the occasional interventions 
from 1998 till early 2000. Since late 2001, the reserves have increased considerably, though, to over 
euro 22 billion (koruna 700 billion). 
This has important implications for the structure of the CNB’s balance sheet, and consequently for its 
financial results. The volume of foreign exchange reserves exceeds the currency in circulation almost 
threefold. The liquidity is sterilised using reverse repo operations, the volume of sterilisation reaching BIS Papers No 24  157
 
about koruna 460 billion at present. This means that the sterilisation costs are substantial compared 
with the monetary income (seigniorage) the CNB can earn due to its monopoly of issueing currency. 
Indeed, there are accumulated losses from the past in the CNB’s books that reached koruna 72 billion 
at the end of 2003, and are likely to increase even further at the end of 2004.
6  
The overall sterilisation costs can be estimated as a difference between the koruna yield on net foreign 
exchange reserves and the yield the central bank could earn by investing the same amount of money 
in the domestic money market (or by reducing the volume of reverse repo operations by the same 
amount). Table 2 shows an estimate of the CNB’s sterilisation costs calculated for the period of 
1993-2003 from Holub (2004). As we can see, the estimated sterilisation costs were increasing from 
1993 to 1996. The central bank accumulated more and more foreign exchange reserves, which were 
to a large extent being sterilised by the issue of CNB treasury bills that had to pay a higher interest 
rate than the foreign exchange reserves were earning. In 1996, in addition, the costs of foreign 
exchange reserves were increased by an appreciation of the exchange rate within its widened 
fluctuation band. From 1997, ie under the floating, the estimated costs were very volatile due to 
exchange rate changes, but were still negative on average. As a result, the total sum of these costs 
since 1993 has reached about koruna 190 billion (8-10% of yearly GDP at present).   
We can thus see that the CNB’s sterilisation costs have indeed had a strong empirical relevance, even 
though the computations presented here are only a rough measure of these costs based on many 
simplifications (for detail see Holub, 2004). These financial costs of interventions should be taken into 
account - and compared with the expected macroeconomic benefits - when discussing the exchange 
rate management, swinging the balance further towards being faithful to pure floating.
7   
 
Table 2 
Estimated sterilisation costs 
Koruna billions 
CZK  billion  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Net foreign assets   24  112  248  342  359  378  439  488  510  630  706 
Domestic int rate 
(%) 
11.1  8.6 10.9  12  14 13.8  6.6 5.3  5.1  3.5  2.2 
Foreign int rate 
(%)  
5.9 4.9  5  4  4  4.1 3.5 5.1  5.5  4.3  2.9 
Exchange rate 
gains/losses  
–0.3 0  0.2  –8.6  44.7 –35.6  31.8 –3.5 –40.1  –26.2  –29.8 
Estimated costs  
of sterilisation 
–1.6 –4.1  –14.5  –36.1  8.6 –72.1  18.5 –4.4 –38.1  –20.9  –25.3 
Source: Holub (2004). 
 
It should be also mentioned that sterilisation costs may have important implications for the 
effectiveness of interventions, as the Czech experience illustrates. They may undermine the 
interventions’ credibility in those circumstances where sterilisation costs are potentially high, which 
might further increase costs, as unsuccessful interventions tend to be more costly than the successful 
                                                       
6   These accumulated losses, however, do not reflect the sterilisation costs only, but also past quasi-fiscal operations by the 
central bank, such as its involvement in the clean-ups of ailing banks (Holub (2001)) or the cost of the Czechoslovak 
federation split-up. These transformation costs alone had the same order of magnitude as the CNB’s accumulated loss.  
7   Unfortunately, the scope for a central bank to reduce sterilisation costs is quite limited once high foreign exchange reserves 
are accumulated on its balance sheet, if it does not want to influence the exchange rate substantially or to give up its 
monetary policy goals. One possibility is to start selling the reserves gradually. This was in fact the motivation behind the 
CNB’s decision to start selling the earnings on its foreign exchange reserves to prevent their further growth - see footnote 3.   158  BIS Papers No 24
 
ones (there is thus a self-fulfilling element in an intervention’s financial credibility).
8 If financial 
credibility is low, it might be helpful to strengthen it by making the interventions more sustainable. For 
example, the CNB’s agreement with the government has included as its crucial part the government’s 
participation in sterilisation costs incurred by the CNB due to the direct purchases of public foreign 
exchange revenues. This provision has made the agreement financially sustainable for the CNB, and 
thus more credible. Similarly, the credibility of the CNB’s foreign exchange interventions increased 
when the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the eurozone became negative, which led to the 
interventions being viewed by the market as profitable. 
5. Communication  issues 
Typically, the procedures governing decisions on interventions are much less clearly defined than the 
rules for interest rates. The international standards on transparency of exchange rate management 
policies are rather vague, compared with other policy areas. On the one hand, there are arguments in 
favour of clarity on the mandate, rules and procedures for the authorities carrying out interventions. On 
the other hand, it is acknowledged that “there are circumstances in which it would be inappropriate for 
central banks to disclose their near-term monetary and exchange rate policy implementation tactics 
and provide detailed information on foreign exchange operations” (IMF (1999); see also Chiu (2003)). 
The international practice is also quite diverse, and there are considerable differences in the 
disclosure policy even among countries practising the same exchange rate regime (Chiu (2003)). The 
difficulty in defining clear procedures may be partly connected to the fact that the economic literature 
gives no clear guidance in this respect. The literature on the effectiveness of interventions leads to 
differing conclusions, based on which channel of their transmission is emphasised. With regard for 
example to transparency procedures, if one relies on the signalling effect a logical recommendation 
would be to carry out open foreign exchange interventions. On the other hand, if one bets on the order 
flow effect, policy announcements may be counterproductive (see Canales-Kriljenko et al (2003); 
Chiu (2003)).  
The lack of transparency and other operational rules may also be justified by the fundamental 
difference in the central bank’s position in the foreign exchange market compared with the domestic 
money market. While in the money market, central banks have an almost perfect control over short-
term interest rates, in the foreign exchange market they are only one of many players, too weak to 
lean against the market. A central bank can afford to discuss openly the pros and cons of its interest 
rate decisions and possibly signal the likely direction of its future actions. This does not weaken its 
impact on the short-end of the yield curve, and may only increase - and make more predictable - its 
impact on longer-term interest rates. On the other hand, foreign exchange interventions may be 
ineffective when anticipated by the market, as they may have no further signalling effect or impact on 
the risk premium. It could also be strongly counterproductive if the central bank expressed any doubts 
about the interventions’ effectiveness or appropriateness, as this could weaken their signalling effect. 
Publishing the voting ratios or dissenting views in real-time might thus be damaging.
9      
Let me now look at the communication of foreign exchange interventions in the Czech Republic. At 
times, the fact that the CNB was intervening was announced immediately (eg on 31 March 1998, 
4  October 1999, 21  January 2002, or most recently 10 April 2002; see Table 3), but on other 
occasions the CNB carried out “undisclosed” interventions (eg in December 2001 or in July-September 
2002). Discussions of exchange rate issues appeared in the minutes of the regular monetary policy 
meetings or extraordinary monetary policy meetings at which interest rate decisions were discussed. 
Only sometimes, however, did the minutes also include clear information on interventions. This 
happened either in the case of extraordinary meetings called due to exchange rate developments 
(such as on 21 January 2002 or 11 July 2002) or after some regular meetings (eg 4 October 1999, 
                                                       
8   Note that this credibility aspect is exactly opposite to what has been suggested by Mussa (1981). He has argued that the 
possibility of a central bank’s losses is positive for credibility, because it can work as a commitment device. In our case, it 
was the reduction of the possible losses that helped, by causing the interventions to be viewed as financially sustainable.  
9   It might still be possible and advisable, though, to publish the Board discussions with rather a long time lag for the sake of 
accountability.  BIS Papers No 24  159
 
30 March 2000, and 25 October 2001). But information on the voting ratio was given only in some of 
those cases, when the decision was unanimous.
10 The CNB also published its agreement with the 
government, including the alternatives that had been considered; in this exceptional case the 
exchange rate policy was very transparent. 
 
Table 3 
Communication of interventions 
Starting month  Final month  Short description 
02/1998  04/1998  Open interventions on 31 March announced by a press release (but 
some interventions already in February), no minutes 
06/1998  07/1998  Open entry to the market on 14 July; stated in minutes of the 
monetary policy Board meeting of 16 July 
10/1999  10/1999  Open interventions on 4 October, published in minutes (detailed 
explanation; unanimous voting) 
12/1999  12/1999  Minutes only mention a consensus view on the necessity to prevent 
excessive appreciation (+warning against interventions was given 
already in November)  
03/2000  03/2000  Open interventions on 30 March, announced by press release, 
published in minutes (unanimous decision) 
10/2001  01/2002  25 October: regular MP meeting, decision to intervene published in 
minutes (unanimous); 20 December: regular meeting, interventions 
discussed, but no decision announced; 21 January 2002: 
extraordinary meeting, interventions announced and published in 
separate minutes (unanimous decision) 
04/2002  04/2002  4 April: extraordinary MP meeting, interventions announced by press 
release; 10 April: interventions with a press release 
07/2002  09/2002  11 July: extraordinary meeting, no decisions announced immediately, 
minutes include decision on interventions (no voting ratio); 
subsequent interventions not disclosed directly  
 
 
The monthly volume of interventions is published with a lag of two months (since July 1998), which is 
the main regular channel for communicating the interventions. As reported by Canales-Kriljenko 
(2003), intervention volumes are published only by 25 percent of all central banks that responded to 
questions in a survey concerning the transparency of their intervention policies. This means that the 
CNB belongs to the minority group of more transparent central banks in this respect (even though 
some other banks publish daily intervention volumes, which is a step further in transparency). It can 
thus be concluded that some minimal communication standards are in place concerning the CNB’s 
decisions on foreign exchange interventions, but a considerable degree of discretion remains in this 
area, unlike for interest rate decisions. 
6. Summary  and  conclusions 
In this note, I discussed the role of foreign exchange interventions in the Czech inflation targeting 
regime. Since May 1997, the Czech Republic has operated a managed floating exchange rate with the 
euro (previously the Deutsche mark) serving as a reference currency. In line with that, the CNB has 
                                                       
10   In mid-2001, the CNB’s Board decided to publish full transcripts of its monetary policy meetings with a lag of six years. This 
means that the details of the intervention debates from these meetings will also become public. Nevertheless, the transcripts 
are produced only from those meetings at which interest rate changes are discussed.  160  BIS Papers No 24
 
intervened occasionally in the foreign exchange market. With the exception of the year 1997, the 
interventions were directed against the koruna’s appreciation only. The periods of intervention activity 
included December 1997 to July 1998, October 1999 to March 2000, and the period from late 2001 till 
September 2002.  
Moreover, a special account for the government’s foreign exchange privatisation revenues was 
established at the CNB in early 2000, and strengthened by an agreement between the CNB and the 
government in January 2002. This agreement has kept all the government’s foreign exchange 
revenues out of the market and at the same time allowed the government to finance its fiscal needs 
out of the privatisation revenues. So far, the CNB has purchased over euro 4.2 billion directly from the 
state. The agreement includes the government’s participation in sterilisation costs of the CNB due to 
these direct purchases.  
The stylised facts do not give any clear answer concerning the effectiveness of the interventions. It 
seems that sometimes they might have had an immediate impact, lasting up to two or three months. 
However, no particular, “ideal” intervention strategy can be identified at first sight. Something that 
worked in one situation may have little effect in another. Moreover, even many of the “successful” 
interventions were not able to prevent quite prolonged periods of exchange rate overvaluation in 1998 
and in 2002. The initial impact of the CNB’s agreement with the government was also disappointing. 
Nevertheless, the undisclosed interventions that the CNB used in July-September 2002 (altogether 
roughly euro 1 billion) seem to have had an important effect thanks to a combination of several factors, 
a change in the market expectations being probably the most important of these. And to the extent 
that the policy measures contributed to these changed expectations, one could say that they had a 
medium-term impact on the exchange rate. In sum, the experience so far seems to favour a signalling 
role for foreign exchange interventions, which however implies a rather unstable transmission between 
central bank actions and market reactions. The strategy that worked in the second half of 2002, for 
example, cannot be thought of as a universally effective recipe for any future turbulent period.  
An important aspect of the interventions that must not be overlooked is sterilisation costs. I have 
shown that these have indeed had a strong empirical relevance in the Czech Republic. Their volume 
since 1993 has been considerable, partly as a heritage of the fixed exchange rate regime till May 1997 
and partly due to interventions under floating. The sterilisation costs had a negative impact on the 
interventions’ credibility and effectiveness till 2002, when the interest-rate differential vis-à-vis the 
eurozone became negative and the interventions started to be viewed as profitable by the market. 
Another issue that has often been overlooked by the literature on managed floating is the difficulty in 
defining clear procedural rules for foreign exchange interventions. This may be quite important, 
though, when managed floating is combined with the inflation targeting regime. The lack of clear rules 
and transparency typically surrounding foreign exchange interventions contrasts with the clearly 
defined procedures guiding the interest rate decisions, which may occasionally create tensions in the 
monetary policy regime. The Czech experience has been in line with this general conclusion. BIS Papers No 24  161
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